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Abstract
We develop a delay time model for a one component system with postponed
replacement to analyze situations in which maintenance might not be executed im-
mediately upon discovery of a defect in the system. Reasons for postponement are
numerous: to avoid production disruption or unnecessary or ineffective replacement;
to prepare for replacement; to extend component life; to wait for an opportunity.
This paper explores conditions that make postponement cost-effective. We are in-
terested in modelling the reality in which a maintainer either prioritizes functional
continuity or is not confident of the inspection test indicating a defective state.
In some cases more frequent inspection and a longer time limit for postponement
are recommended to take advantage of maintenance opportunities, characterized by
their low cost, arising after a positive inspection. However, when the cost of fail-
ure increases, a significant reduction in the time limit of postponement interval is
observed. The examples reveal that both the time to defect arrival and delay time
have a significant effect upon the cost-effectiveness of maintenance at the limit of
postponement. Also, more simply, we find that opportunities must occur frequently
enough and inspection should be a high quality procedure to risk postponement.
Keywords: opportunistic maintenance; delay time modelling; imperfect in-
spection; false positive; false negative; postponed replacement; manufacturing
1 Introduction
In this paper, we develop a model to analyze different situations in which maintenance
might be postponed. Often there exist situations that encourage postponement because
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loses are a consequence of immediate action, such as: 1) disruption of a production
plan due to system downtime; 2) expenses with responsive logistics that provide the
resources necessary to do the maintenance; 3) poor utilization of components, when the
replacement is effected too early, even after a defect arrival; 4) ineffective early replacement
as a result of a false positive (whereby inspection indicates that a system is defective
when the system is in fact non-defective); 5) poor installation as a result of insufficient
preparation; 6) missing the possibility to extend the life of a system; 7) where unnecessary
maintenance is carried out on an obsolete system that is scheduled for replacement; 8)
missing opportunities for maintenance intervention that may arise in the near future.
The first of these points is the concern of Zequeira et al [42] who offer a further reason to
postpone: to give time to increase a downstream inventory in a manufacturing production
line. To decrease an upstream inventory is another potential reason for postponement.
Chen [10] indicates that stoppages due to maintenance can result in tardy and non-
resumable jobs. Thus the need to schedule maintenance so that no delays or suspended
work result provides additional causes to postpone.
Van Oosterom et al [35] are concerned with 2 and 3, making use of the delay-time con-
cept (Christer [11]) whereby the defective state precedes the failed state, but relaxing the
assumption that replacement immediately follows a positive inspection (whereby inspec-
tion of a system indicates that the system is defective). To characterize postponement,
they assume a deterministic delay time (the sojourn in the defective state). In our paper,
we relax this restrictive assumption. Further, we allow the possibility that inspections
may be imperfect, so that false negatives (whereby inspection indicates that the system
is no-defective when it is in fact defective) and false positives are possible (as in Berrade
et al [6], [7], [8]). The consequences of imperfect maintenance interventions mentioned
in points 4 and 5 whereby strong components may be replaced with weak components
have been analyzed in Scarf and Cavalcante [30] and [31]. In this new context, we can
consider points 4 and 5 as reasons for postponement, and also related to these, belief of
the maintainer that the system is good when inspection indicates otherwise. Points 6 and
7 are the concern of Adkins and Paxson (2013).
Nakagawa [22] describes a preventive policy that can be executed only at scheduled
times. When the number of accumulated failures exceeds a given number, the maintenance
is postponed to the next such time. The author considers the use of these idle periods
for maintenance a practical procedure since they do not interfere the normal operation
of the system. Postponement of replacement following a positive inspection (inspection
indicates that the system is defective) is also related to the policies in which replacement
is scheduled for the end of the first completed cycle of operation or mission that follows
a specified time T (Zhao et al [43], Nakagawa [25]) or the crossing of a specified wear
or damage threshold Z (Zhao and Nakagawa [41]), all of which are random maintenance
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policies in the sense of Nakagawa [23]. Yang et al [39] present a maintenance policy,
combining periodic and random inspections. The latter are carried out at the completion
of each mission to take advantage of the idle periods between missions and reduce the
downtime caused by inspections.
The final point, point 8, concerning the use of opportunities is the basis of opportunistic
maintenance (Dekker and Smeitink [13]; Dekker and Dijkstra [14]), and the developments
that have followed. Opportunities can arise as a result of, for example, planned periods
of system idleness (e.g. Tambe et al [34]; Xia et al [38]), failures of some other subsystem
(e.g. Jhang and Sheu [18], Rao and Bhadury [27]; Taghipour and Banjevic [32], [33];
Laggoune et al [20], [21]) or due to some other cause (e.g. Bedford and Alkali [4], Bedford
et al [5]), and opportunities are typically assumed to arise at random (e.g. Jhang and
Sheu [18]; Okamura and Dohi [26]) to a greater (Satow and Osaki [29]), or lesser extent
(Bad´ıa and Berrade [3]). Additional references to opportunistic maintenance can be found
in [16] and [19].
We are similarly concerned with the arrival of opportunities although we do not specify
their underlying nature or regard opportunities as the principal motivation of our work.
Rather we view them as just this, opportunities. Instead, we seek to model the reality,
in which a maintainer either prioritizes functional continuity or does not believe the
inspection signal or both, more closely than other works that have appeared to date.
The structure of the papers is as follows. In the next section we describe our model
(model 1) and its assumptions, and develop the calculations for the long run expected cost
of failure and maintenance activity per unit time (the cost-rate). In so doing we determine
the expected cost of a renewal cycle, and the expected length of a renewal cycle. Section
3 analyzes some related models: 1- no postponement, that is immediate replacement at
a positive inspection. 2- postponement with inspections involving a downtime cost. This
latter extension is denoted by model 2. 3- In contrast with the asymptotic formulation
of the foregoing models, the final model presented in Section 3 studies postponement
over a finite horizon. In Section 4 we describe some numerical results in the context of
a manufacturing system and the behaviour of optimal policy for plausible values of the
model parameters. We finish with our conclusions about the models, their implications
for practice, limitations and suggestions for development.
2 Maintenance model
Notation
• T : inspection interval.
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• τ : time limit for postponement following a positive inspection.
• M : maximum number of inspections in a cycle.
• c1: inspection cost
• co: cost of renewal on opportunity
• cτ : cost of replacement at the time limit for postponement.
• cF : cost of replacement on failure
• cp: cost of preventive replacement at MT
We consider a one-component system; that is, the system comprises a component and
a socket that together perform an operational function and component replacement is a
system renewal, in the sense of Ascher and Feingold [2]. The component can be in one
of three states: good, defective or failed. Failures are discovered as soon as they occur
whereas the component is inspected at times kT , k = 1, 2, . . . to detect the defective
state. We assume inspections are imperfect, with α and β denoting the probabilities of a
false positive (inspection signal indicates component is defective when component is good)
and a false negative (inspection signal indicates component is good when component is
defective) inspection, respectively.
The component is replaced
• on failure,
• when an opportunity arises after a positive inspection,
• at the end of a period τ after a positive inspection (the limit of postponement),
• at MT
whichever occurs soonest.
In the model we use the terminology “replacement” throughout, although in reality
the modeller may be concerned with some other maintenance intervention or action.
Provided that such a maintenance intervention can be assumed to renew the system, then
it is appropriate to call such an intervention a replacement.
In what follows X and Y denote the time to defect arrival and the delay time (sojourn
in the defective state) respectively. In addition fX(x) and fY (y) are their corresponding
density functions. We assume X and Y are independent. We consider that opportunities
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arise according to a Poisson process with rate λ and therefore the time from a positive
inspection to the arrival of an opportunity, Z, has an exponential distribution with mean
1/λ.
We suppose that once a positive inspection has occurred (true or false) there are no
more inspections prior to replacement. This mimics to an extent the reality in which: i)
maintainers are aware of a problem with the system, albeit without full confidence, but
are unwilling to cease operation, at least for another τ time units, unless an opportunity
to do so arises; and ii) they are unwilling to undertake further inspection of what they
consider a defective system. Nonetheless, if the first M−1 inspections are negative and the
system survives to MT then we assume that an inspection occurs at replacement at MT .
The practical justification for this inspection is the desire to identify the component state
at replacement, so that for example the maintainer can decide whether the component
should be scrapped or returned to spares.
Finally, we note that the replacement policy implies that if a positive inspection occurs
at iT , then the limit of postponement is iT + τ . If iT + τ > MT and no opportunity
or failure occurs before MT , then the system is replaced at MT . A variation on this
policy might instead suppose that postponement overrides preventive replacement at MT
. This would modify the expressions that follow in a small way and could be considered
in principle. Other policy variations might also be considered: preventive replacement is
undertaken at the first opportunity following a positive inspection or at a positive inspec-
tion if the previous inspections are all positive, so that the decision variable “maximum
number of consecutive positive inspections” replaces M , the maximum number of inspec-
tions until preventive replacement. We suspect that this policy could only be evaluated
by simulation. Such a policy might operate with or without postponement. In the policy
we consider, it may be simpler to regard the time limit for postponement as fixed (reflect-
ing say the time needed to prepare for replacement through organization of spares and
labour) rather than a variable to be optimized. We might even constrain the inspection
interval so that τ > T . This would facilitate simpler calculations.
The calculations in this section hold for an infinite planning horizon. That is, we
assume in the customary manner that every time a new system is put in the place of the
one in use, the new one is statistically identical to the one replaced. This assumption
means that the theory of renewal-reward processes [28] holds and thus the asymptotic
cost-rate criterion is an appropriate one for optimization. Other approaches could be
used, such as to use a one-cycle criterion (e.g. [12], [36]) and this might indeed describe
more closely the pressing need to postpone. In spite of this, we develop the elements of
the cost-rate: the expected cost per renewal cycle and the expected length of a renewal
cycle. We do this by considering all disjoint events that imply renewal, and determining
in turn the cost, duration and probability of these disjoint renewal events.
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2.1 Preliminary calculations
Let Ji be an indicator function as follows
Ji =
{
1, τ < (M − i)T,
0, otherwise.
When there is a positive inspection at iT , Ji takes value 0 if the limit of postponement is
beyond the time (M − i)T . Observe that if Ji = 0 then Js = 0, s = i+ 1, . . . ,M − 1.
The probability of renewal when an opportunity arises after a true positive inspection
at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (OTPi) = (1)
Ji
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx+
(1− Ji)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ MT
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx
Note that (1 − α) is the probability of a true negative (the system is good and the
inspection indicates so) and (1 − β) is the probability of a true positive (the system is
defective and the inspection indicates so).
The foregoing result is obtained by first conditioning on a defect arising before iT .
Given this event, for replacement to occur when an opportunity arises, there must be no
false positives at the first j−1 inspections previous to the defective state (with probability
(1−α)j−1). After the defect arises the subsequent i−j inspections must be false negatives
(with probability βi−j) and finally a true positive must occur at iT (with probability
1− β). The corresponding probability is ∑ij=1(1−α)j−1βi−j(1− β) ∫ jT(j−1)T fX(x)dx. The
opportunity must arise before the limit of postponement if Ji = 1 and before MT if
Ji = 0. In addition there must be no failure before the opportunity. This absence of
failure before the opportunity is captured in the third integral.
A similar conditioning argument, along with conditions on the occurrence of false and
true positive and negative inspections, the duration of the delay time, and the occurrence
of (random) opportunities, is used to obtain the following results.
The probability of renewal at τ time units after a true positive inspection at iT ,
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i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 (the limit of postponement) is
P (PTPi) = (2)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(
Ji
∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
iT+τ−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx
If the postponement limit is beyond MT (Ji = 0), the previous integral is equal to zero
and there is no replacement on postponement but at MT .
The probability of renewal on failure after a true positive inspection at iT , i =
1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (FTPi) = (3)
Ji
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ−x
iT−x
fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx+
(1− Ji)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ MT−x
iT−x
fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx
If Ji = 1 then the failure has to occur before both the opportunity and the end of post-
ponement. If Ji = 0 then failure takes place before both the opportunity and preventive
replacement at MT .
The probability of renewal at an opportunity following a false positive inspection at
iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (OFPi) = (4)
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ iT+τ
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ z
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
dz +
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ iT+τ
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z
fX(x)dx
)
dz +
(1− Ji)(1− α)i−1α
∫ MT
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ z
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
dz +
(1− Ji)(1− α)i−1α
∫ MT
iT
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z
fX(x)dx
)
dz
In the previous calculations the opportunity has to occur before both the limit of post-
ponement and MT whichever comes first.
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The probability of renewal at the limit of postponement after a false positive inspection
at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (PFPi) = (5)
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
(∫ iT+τ
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
iT+τ−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
+
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
∫ ∞
iT+τ
fX(x)dx
Again this integral is zero if the limit of postponement is beyond MT . If so, the replace-
ment occurs at MT ,
The probability of renewal on failure after a false positive inspection at iT , i =
1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (FFPi) = (6)
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ iT+τ
iT
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ−x
0
fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx+
(1− Ji)(1− α)i−1α
∫ MT
iT
fX(x)
(∫ MT−x
0
fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx
The probability of renewal on failure after a false negative inspection at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M -1
is
P (FFNi) = (7)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j+1
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ (i+1)T−x
iT−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
The probability of renewal on failure after a true negative inspection at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M -1
is
P (FTNi) = (1− α)i
∫ (i+1)T
iT
fX(x)
(∫ (i+1)T−x
0
fY (y)dy
)
dx (8)
The unit will be renewed at the scheduled preventive replacement and thus the length
of a cycle will be MT if any of the following events occur:
1.- If the M − 1 first inspections are negative and no failure occurs before MT . This
event is denoted by R1.
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2.- If there is a true positive inspection at iT (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1), the limit of post-
ponement overrides MT and no opportunity and no failure arises before MT . This
event is denoted by Ri2.
3.- If there is a false positive inspection at iT (for i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1), the limit of
postponement overrides MT and no opportunity and no failure arises before MT .
This event is denoted by Ri3.
Let K be the number of inspections in a cycle where K = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,M .
P (K = 0) =
∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ T−x
0
fY (y)dy
)
dx = FX+Y (T )
where FX+Y denotes the cumulative distribution of X + Y .
For i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1
P (K = i) = (9)
P (OTPi) + P (PTPi) + P (FTPi) + P (OFPi) + P (PFPi) +
+P (FFPi) + P (FFNi) + P (FTNi) + P (R
i
2) + P (R
i
3)
because the events OTPi, PTPi, FTPi, OFPi, PFPi, FFPi, FFNi, FTNi, R
i
2, and R
i
3
are mutually exclusive. It is important to note that in case that any of the events Ri2 or
Ri3 takes place, i inspections have been carried out.
We assume that the system is inspected at MT if it survives to this age. We justify this
on the basis that, in practice, such an inspection may be used to obtain information about
the state of the component at replacement. This knowledge may be useful for reliability
estimation, to justify future postponement times, or for decision-making about posterior
reuse of the replaced component. We could assume otherwise, and the expressions we
derived below would be modified accordingly and only in a trivial way. The case K = M
occurs when the first M − 1 inspections are negative and no failure occurs before MT .
That is
P (K = M) = (10)
M∑
i=1
(1− α)i−1βM−i
∫ iT
(i−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
MT−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx+ (1− α)M−1
∫ ∞
MT
fX(x)dx
It follows that P (R1) = P (K = M). Therefore for those cases where M ≥ 2 if K = M
then system is renewed at MT but the converse is not true. If M = 1 both events, renewal
at T and K = 1 are the same.
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The first term in (10) is obtained by first conditioning on a defect arising in the ith
inspection interval. This occurs with probability
∫ iT
(i−1)T fX(x)dx. Given this event, for
replacement to occur at MT , there must be no false positives at the first i−1 inspections
(with probability (1− α)i−1), and the subsequent M − i inspections up to the Mth must
be false negatives (with probability βM−i), and there must be no failure before time MT .
This absence of failure before MT is represented by the second integral. The second term
in (10) is obtained conditioning on no defect and no false alarm occurring before MT .
The probabilities of Ri2 and R
i
3 are respectively:
P (Ri2) = (11)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(
(1− Ji)e−λ(M−i)T
(∫ ∞
MT−x
fY (y)dy
))
dx
P (Ri3) = (12)
(1− α)i−1αe−λ(M−i)T (1− Ji)
∫ MT
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
MT−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx+
(1− α)i−1αe−λ(M−i)T (1− Ji)
∫ ∞
MT
fX(x)dx
Thus we can obtain the expected number of inspections in a cycle
E[K] =
M∑
i=1
iP (K = i)
Let R denote a cycle ending at MT . Then
P (R) = P (R1) +
M−1∑
i=1
P (Ri2) +
M−1∑
i=1
P (Ri3) (13)
2.2 Expected length of a cycle
In what follows L will denote the length of a cycle. Next we obtain its expected value,
E[L].
The system can fail before the first inspection. We denote this event by I. If so, K = 0
and the mean length of a cycle conditional to the system entering the defective state at
x and failing at y before the first inspection is
E[L|I] = x+ y
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Let A be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
A =
∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ T−x
0
(x+ y)fY (y)dy
)
dx =
∫ T
0
ufX+Y (u)du (14)
where fX+Y denotes the density of X + Y .
The conditional expected length of a cycle finishing when an opportunity arises after
a true positive inspection at iT is given by
E[L|OTPi] = Ji
∫ iT+τ
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT ) + (1− Ji)
∫ MT
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
The second integral in the foregoing expression corresponds to the case in which the time
limit of postponement is beyond MT . If so, the opportunity has to occur before MT .
Let mi be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
mi = (15)
Ji
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx+
(1− Ji)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ MT
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs at the postponement limit
following a true positive inspection at iT is given by
E[L|PTPi] = Ji(iT + τ)
If τ overrides MT (Ji = 0), then the length of the cycle is MT . This event occurs
with probability P (Ri2) given in (11).
Let ni be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
ni = (16)
Ji(iT + τ)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
iT+τ−x
fY (y)dy
)
dz
)
dx
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs on failure after a true
positive inspection at iT , when a defect arises at x and failure at y, is
E[L|FTPi] = x+ y
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Let ri be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
ri = (17)
Ji
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ−x
iT−x
(x+ y)fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx+
(1− Ji)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ MT−x
iT−x
(x+ y)fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs at an opportunity arising
after a false positive inspection at iT is
E[L|OFPi] = Ji
(∫ iT+τ
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
+ (1− Ji)
(∫ MT
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
Let si be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
si = (18)
(1− α)i−1αJi
∫ iT+τ
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ z
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
dz +
(1− α)i−1αJi
∫ iT+τ
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z
fX(x)dx
)
dz +
(1− α)i−1α(1− Ji)
∫ MT
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ z
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
z−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
dz +
(1− α)i−1α(1− Ji)
∫ MT
iT
zλe−λ(z−iT )
(∫ ∞
z
fX(x)dx
)
dz
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs at the postponement limit
following a false positive inspection at iT is
E[L|PFPi] = Ji(iT + τ)
If τ overrides MT (Ji = 0), then the length of the cycle is MT . This event occurs with
probability P (Ri3) given in (12).
Let ti be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
ti = (19)
Ji(iT + τ)(1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
(∫ iT+τ
iT
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
iT+τ−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
)
+
Ji(iT + τ)(1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT+τ
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
∫ ∞
iT+τ
fX(x)dx
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The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs on failure after a false
positive inspection at iT , conditional on the defect arising at x and failure at y, is
E[L|FFPi] = x+ y
Let ui be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
ui = (20)
Ji(1− α)i−1α
∫ iT+τ
iT
fX(x)
(∫ iT+τ−x
0
(x+ y)fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx+
(1− Ji)(1− α)i−1α
∫ MT
iT
fX(x)
(∫ MT−x
0
(x+ y)fY (y)
(∫ ∞
x+y
λe−λ(z−iT )dz
)
dy
)
dx
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs on failure after a false
negative inspection at iT , conditional on the defect arising at x and failure at y, is
E[L|FFNi] = x+ y
Let vi be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
vi = (21)
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j+1
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ (i+1)T−x
iT−x
(x+ y)fY (y)dy
)
dx
The conditional expected cycle length when the renewal occurs on failure after a true
negative inspection at iT , conditional on the defect arising at x and failure at y, is
E[L|FTNi] = x+ y
Let wi be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
wi = (1− α)i
∫ (i+1)T
iT
fX(x)
(∫ (i+1)T−x
0
(x+ y)fY (y)dy
)
dx (22)
The conditional expected cycle length when preventive replacement occurs at time
MT is MT . Let B be the corresponding unconditional expected cycle length. Then
B = MT × P (R)
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with P (R) given in (13).
Let D be the event that describes how the renewal cycle is completed:
D = {On failure} ∪ {When an opportunity arises after a positive inspection} ∪
{At the the limit of postponement after a positive inspection} ∪ {At MT}
It follows that
E[L] = E[E[L|D]]
and therefore
E[L] = A+
M−1∑
i=1
(mi + ni + ri + si + ti + ui + vi + wi) +B (23)
2.3 Expected cost of a cycle
The expected total cost of inspections in a cycle is
cins = c1E[K].
The expected cost in a cycle as a consequence of renewal at an opportunity is
copp = co
M−1∑
i=1
(P (OTPi) + P (OFPi)),
The expected cost in a cycle due to renewal at the postponement limit is
cpost = cτ
M−1∑
i=1
(P (PTPi) + P (PFPi)),
The expected cost in a cycle due to failure is
cfail = cF (P (K = 0) +
M−1∑
i=1
(P (FTPi) + P (FFPi) + P (FFNi) + P (FTNi))),
and the expected cost in a cycle due to preventive replacement at MT is
cprev = cpP (R).
14
Hence the expected cost of a cycle is
E[C] = cins + copp + cpost + cfail + cprev. (24)
The long-run cost per unit time (or cost-rate) from the renewal theorem is then sim-
ply Q(T,M, τ) = E[C]/E[L]. Optimum values of the decision variables M and T can be
sought by minimizing Q(T,M, τ) for a given τ . Alternatively, the time limit for postpone-
ment τ itself can be regarded as a decision variable and cost-minimized. This latter point
is interesting as it provides the optimum period by which the maintainer could extend
the useful life of a system once a defective state is reported. The examples in Section 4
consider the minimization with respect to three decision variables, M , T , and τ .
3 Other models of interest
In this Section we analyze some related models with special interest. The model in Berrade
et al ([7]) appears to be a particular case when τ = 0 although both models present a
different cost structure. On the other hand a natural extension of the model with non-
negligible inspection times and an associated cost is developed. The case M = 1 matches
the classical age-replacement policy. A model suitable for a finite time horizon is also
presented.
3.1 The case τ = 0
The case τ = 0 represents no postponement, that is, the unit is replaced as soon an
inspection indicates that it is defective, the inspection being true positive or false positive.
If so, the following probabilities become zero: renewal on opportunity after a true positive
inspection P (OTPi) in (1) or a false positive inspection P (OFPi) in (4), renewal on failure
after a true positive inspection P (FTPi) in (3) or false positive inspection P (FFPi) in
(6). When τ = 0 a failure may occur after a negative inspection, whether it is a true
negative or not, but never after a positive one because a positive inspection always implies
the immediate replacement of the unit. The formulas for the probabilities of renewal on
failure after a false negative, P (FFNi), and after a true negative P (FTNi) remain exactly
as they are in (7) and (8), respectively.
The probabilities of renewal at the limit of postponement following a true positive
inspection P (PTPi) in (2) or a false positive inspection P (PFPi) in (5) require special
attention since only parts of them become zero. Now, they reflect that the unit is replaced
at a positive inspection. The resulting expressions in the case τ = 0 are then as follows:
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The probability of renewal at a true positive inspection at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 (the
limit of postponement) is
P (PTPi) =
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
iT−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
The probability of renewal at a false positive inspection at iT , i = 1, 2, . . . ,M − 1 is
P (PFPi) = (1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT
fX(x)dx
Regarding the cycle which ends at the scheduled preventive replacement at MT , the
probabilities of the events denoted by Ri2 and R
i
3 both are now equal to zero.
The following formulae related to the expected length of a cycle are also equal to zero
when τ = 0: mi in (15), ri in (17), si in (18), ui in (20). The expressions for renewal
on failure after a false negative (vi in (21)) and true negative (wi in (22)) do not change.
In addition we have that the unconditional expected length of a cycle following a true
positive (ni in (16)) or following a false positive (ti in (19)) is now
ni = iT
i∑
j=1
(1− α)j−1βi−j(1− β)
∫ jT
(j−1)T
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
iT−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx
ti = iT (1− α)i−1α
∫ ∞
iT
fX(x)dx.
It can be verified that the resulting expressions for the case τ = 0 lead to the model in
Berrade et al ([7]) which is a particular case.
3.2 Model 2. Non-negligible inspection times
Although the algebra of the current model for τ = 0 and that in Berrade et al [7] are
coincident, the structure of the costs corresponding to preventive replacement is different
in both models. The model in Berrade et al ([7]) assumes that the preventive replacement
cost after a positive inspection is equal to that at the scheduled preventive replacement
at MT and the numerical example analyzes this case. In the current model, considering
that the preventive replacement costs at the limit of postponement τ (cτ ) or at scheduled
time MT (cp) are equal would make no sense since one of the reasons of postponement is
that immediate replacement is high-cost. For example van Oosterom et al [35] model the
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preventive replacement cost as a non-increasing function of the postponement interval.
Therefore at a positive inspection (defect found), a decision-maker will postpone for four
reasons:
a) time is needed to prepare for the replacement.
b) the system is urgently required for operation.
c) to get some more life from the sub-system
d) an opportunity to carry out replacement may arise.
The motivations a), b) and d) suggest the broad cost structure: co < cp < cτ < cF . The
examples show that when the following two conditions hold: the time to defective state
follows an exponential distribution and the probability of false negatives is low, M =∞.
A similar result is proved in Berrade et al [6]. Moreover note that the model in its current
terms does not include any downtime or any other penalty when inspections are carried
out and T ? and τ ? show no asymptotic behaviour but tend, respectively, to 0 and infinity
for those cases where X is exponential and M = ∞. Then sub-optimal policies should
be considered. To avoid this we consider an extension of the model, denoted by model 2,
which takes into account a downtime cost associated with inspections. We assume here
that the inspection times are independent and identically distributed random variables
with mean time µ2. The length of the cycle is then
E[L2] = A+
M−1∑
i=1
(mi + ni + ri + si + ti + ui + vi + wi) +B + µ2E[K]
where K is the number of inspections in a cycle.
The development of the model is completed by including a downtime cost incurred at
each inspection. Let cd be the downtime cost per unit of time due to failed tasks or unmet
demands that occur during inspections. In this case the expected cost of a cycle is
E[C2] = cins + copp + cpost + cfail + cprev + µ2cdE[K].
Now the long-run cost per unit time (or cost-rate) is given by Q2(T,M, τ) = E[C2]/E[L2].
3.3 The case M = 1
The case M = 1 is an extension of the classical age-replacement policy based on the delay-
time model. If M = 1 then there is neither postponement nor renewal on opportunity
following a positive inspection. The system is renewed
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• on failure,
• at T if it has not failed before
As before, let us suppose that the unit is inspected at T even though it is renewed.
Then, the number of inspections in a cycle, K, can be 0 or 1 with the following probabil-
ities:
P (K = 0) =
∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ T−x
0
fY (y)dy
)
dx = FX+Y (T )
P (K = 1) =
∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
T−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx+
∫ ∞
T
fX(x)dx.
Note that K = 0 when the unit is renewed on failure and K = 1 when the unit is renewed
on inspection.
Hence the length of a cycle is
E[L] =∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ T−x
0
(x+ y)fY (y)dy
)
dx+ T
(∫ T
0
fX(x)
(∫ ∞
T−x
fY (y)dy
)
dx+
∫ ∞
T
fX(x)dx
)
.
The expected cost of a cycle is
E[C] =
cFP (K = 0) + (c1 + cp)P (K = 1).
3.4 Finite horizon model
Adkins and Paxson [1] justify postponement due to obsolescence. However if the sys-
tem in use is replaced by a non-identical system (with say enhanced functionality or
lower operating costs or both), the times between successive replacements are no longer
identically distributed random variables and then the theory of renewal-reward processes
cannot be used. Therefore the asymptotic formulas do not hold and a finite planning
horizon should be used instead. Nakagawa and Mituzani [24] discuss the importance of
considering maintenance policies with finite planning horizons for systems such as power
plants and civil infrastructures. Berrade et al [8] model imperfect inspection policies for
a system with a finite operational time requirement. These models allow one to explore
maintenance planning options for systems that are close to retirement. The works from
Coolen-Schrijner et al [12] and Venkat et al [36] present also alternatives to an infinite
planning horizon. These authors propose the use of the ‘one-cycle’ optimality criterion.
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They indicate that the term ‘cycle’ represents the period starting at the moment that
a new unit starts functioning, and ending at the moment that the next unit has been
installed, following either preventive or corrective replacement.
We suppose that the system has to function for time S = MT . When the system
does not complete this function for the full time period, due to failure or preventive
replacement, and thus a successor starts functioning before time S, a penalty cost is
incurred. Let cr be the corresponding penalty cost rate. Following Berrade et al ([8]) the
objective function is given as follows:
QF (T,M, τ) = E[C] + cr(S − E[L])
where E[C] and E[L] are respectively given by (23) and (24) in model 1.
4 Numerical examples
We motivate the numerical examples in this section by considering a manufacturing sys-
tem in continuous production (e.g. a food processing production line) with sub-systems
connected in series. Let us suppose that we are interested in the application of the poli-
cies developed in this paper to a critical sub-system in this manufacturing system. By
critical here we mean that failure of the sub-system leads to a large downtime relative
to other sub-systems in the line. We envisage a scenario in which inspections are carried
out to detect defective states to prevent a failure. We consider the cost of preventive
replacement, cp, as a unit cost. The results have been obtained by using the optimization
package of Maple Release 2016.1
In the base case of our numerical study, we use c1 = 0.025, co = 0.8, cτ = 1.5,
and cF = 5. In this way, the cost of replacement at opportunity is less that any other
replacement, justified on the basis that opportunities will typically arise as a production
stoppage due to failure of some other sub-system or due to operational plans (e.g. Xia
et al [38]). If co is not smaller than the cost of preventive replacement at MT , there is
little point to seek the replacement opportunities. Van Oosterom [35] make a similar point
although they are not concerned with opportunities only with postponement. Nonetheless
in their paper for postponement to be effective the cost of replacement at postponement
is very much less (< 20%) of the cost of immediate replacement when a defect is found at
inspection. Furthermore, the cost of replacement at the limit for postponement would be
typically large because it will entail a production stoppage, but not as large as the cost
of a failure since some preparations (allocation of resources and spare parts) will have
been made in advance. There is the possibility that τ = 0, so that replacement occurs
immediately at a positive inspection. In this case again the cost of this replacement will
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be high relative to the cost of the planned replacement at MT . This planned replacement
may correspond to the shutdown of the entire line for preventive maintenance.
In addition, we must have opportunities occurring sufficiently frequently: if opportu-
nities are rare then the decision-maker will not risk postponement. Random arrival of
opportunities is assumed and this is appropriate when the sub-system of interest is part
of a much larger production line. If there were a small number of sub-systems then one
might attempt to model the interacting opportunities so that maintenance interventions
(replacements) might be grouped in the manner of Vu et al [37] or Zhang and Zeng [43]
or Do Van et al [15].
Concerning the time to defective state, an exponential distribution seems to be a
reasonable approach if we consider that the defective state is due to external causes like
shocks or overloads. In our first example, we assume this. The effect of changes in the
mean time to the defective state is analyzed.
Also, if the decision maker is uncertain about the delay-time, he will not risk postpone-
ment unless the benefit is very large. In Van Oosterom [35], the delay time is deterministic,
although of course the time of defect arrival is not known so the time lapse between pos-
itive inspection and failure is itself random. In our case we use a Weibull delay time with
shape parameter equal to 2. The effect of different scale parameters is discussed.
Finally, the inspections are imperfect so that false positives and negatives are possible.
Thus, once a positive inspection occurs there is little point to keep on inspecting because
subsequent inspections offer little or no new information. This is because if the inspection
that follows the first positive inspection is itself negative this may be a false negative or
alternatively the previous one was a false positive. Thus the first positive inspection is
the cue to seek an opportunity and if none arises to replace at the limit for postponement
τ time units since the positive inspection.
There is a clear difficulty to estimate the values of α and β in real applications. Their
values can reflect the variation in the quality of maintenance between the original equip-
ment manufacturer and the operator carrying out maintenance “in-house” as in Berrade
et al (2012) where α and β are assumed to be no greater than 0.2. In the current work
we consider values of β up to 0.4. Although values greater than 0.2 seem to be less re-
alistic they allow us to analyze the competition between preventive replacement at MT
and replacement at the limit of postponement when the maintenance at replacement is
extremely low quality.
In principal we could determine the cost-rate for a fixed τ policy. Such a policy might
be simpler to implement in practice. Nonetheless, we are studying the variable τ policy
to gain insights about postponement and when it is cost-effective. One could imagine a
policy in which we only seek opportunities following N consecutive positive inspections,
for some suitable N . This policy is likely to be analytically intractable. Simulation could
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of course be used to consider such a policy, but this is not the point of this paper.
For values of the parameters, we proceed as follows. Throughout, the unit of time is
1 month. Costs are expressed in an arbitrary unit.
 
Figure 1: Cost function corresponding to model 2, Q(T*=5.42, t), for  M=5, a=10, c=8, 
a=0, b=0.1, l=0.3, cp=1, c1=0.025, c0=0.8, ct=1.5, cF=5, cd=500, m2=0.0005. 
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Example 1: Time to defect arrival modelled by an exponential distribution
1. External shocks are responsible for defect arrival. The time to the defective state, X,
follows an exponential distribution with mean value a. The delay time is assumed
to be a Weibull distribution with shape parameter equal to 2 and scale parameter
c.
2. In the base case the mean time to the defective state is a = 10 months. When
dealing with model 2 a downtime due to inspection equal to 3.5 hours seems to
be a reasonable assumption, therefore we consider that the mean downtime due to
inspection is µ2 = 0.0005
3. Cost of preventive replacement, cp = 1 and cost of inspection c1 = 0.025. In addition
we assume a downtime costs equal to cd = 500
4. The imperfect inspection parameters are α = 0 and β = 0.1 in the base case.
5. Opportunities occur according to a Poisson process with rate λ opportunities per unit
of time with λ = 0.3 in the base case.
6. The decision variables are T , τ and M .
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Figure 1 presents the cost function associated to model 2, that is, when inspections
are considered to be non-negligible with an associated downtime cost and when M = 5.
In Figure 1, Q(T, τ) is plotted for T = T ? = 5.42 and different values of τ . The optimum
limit of postponement is τ ? = 1.09.
Figure 1 shows the effect on the cost function when the inspection frequency is set at
its optimum value and τ varies. Two distinctive features are observed: a discontinuity
in τ ? = 5.42; and an asymptotic behaviour. The former is due to the indicator function
Ji that points out when the limit of postponement is reached before MT . The latter
reveals that the cost is constant when τ is larger than a particular value, because any of
the events, system failure, replacement of the system on opportunity or preventively at
MT , will have taken place by that time. Increasing τ does not modify significantly the
probabilities of any of the foregoing events.
 
Figure 2: Cost function in model 2, Q(T*=5.42, t) (solid line), Q(T=5, t) (…), Q(T=6, t) (--) 
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Figure 2 shows the cost function for three different inspection frequencies. In the
three cases the probability of false negative is β = 0.1 and there exists a postponement
interval (τ > 0) that is preferable to immediate replacement following a positive inspection
(τ = 0).
Table 1 shows the optimum policy (M?, T ?, τ ?) for model 2 for a number of cases.
As defects arrive according to a Poisson process the optimum number of inspections is
M? =∞ whenever the probability of false negative is below a threshold. For those cases
when M? = ∞, the corresponding T ? and τ ? are asymptotic values. This asymptotic
behaviour is observed for model 2 where the penalty of downtime due to inspection is
considered. Note that M? = ∞ indicates that there is no point in carrying out the
22
preventive replacement. However when the inspection procedure is not reliable, with a
high rate of false negatives, the best policy is pure preventive replacement, M? = 1.
This result agrees with that in Berrade et al [6] and the study given therein about the
consequences of low quality inspections on the optimum policy.
Case a c a b l C0 Ct CF M* T* t* M*T* Q* 
1 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 4.70 1.37 ∞ 0.214 
2 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 4.49 4.00 ∞ 0.224 
3 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 3 5 ∞ 4.46 12.48 ∞ 0.227 
4 10 8 0 0.2 0.3 0.8 3 5 ∞ 4.34 12.62 ∞ 0.237 
5 10 8 0 0.3 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 4.29 4.02 ∞ 0.245 
6 10 8 0 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 4.45 2.13 ∞ 0.209 
7 10 8 0 0.1 0.4 0.8 2 5 ∞ 4.33 5.32 ∞ 0.214 
8 12 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 5.12 1.00 ∞ 0.193 
9 12 8 0 0.3 0.2 0.8 2 5 1 10.15 - 10.15 0.229 
10 15 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 5.74 0.53 ∞ 0.170 
11 15 8 0 0.1 0.2 0.8 2 5 ∞ 5.97 1.65 ∞ 0.187 
12 15 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 5.39 3.21 ∞ 0.180 
13 15 8 0 0.1 0.4 0.8 2 5 ∞ 5.15 4.61 ∞ 0.172 
14 15 8 0 0.3 0.2 0.8 2 5 ∞ 6.19 1.44 ∞ 0.202 
15 15 8 0 0.4 0.2 0.8 2 5 1 11.76 - 11.76 0.209 
16 15 10 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 5.88 5.84 ∞ 0.157 
17 15 10 0 0.3 0.2 0.8 2 5 ∞ 6.22 3.58 ∞ 0.181 
18 15 10 0 0.4 0.2 0.8 2 5 1 12.69 - 12.69 0.183 
19 15 12 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 6.45 8.95 ∞ 0.140 
20 15 12 0 0.3 0.2 0.8 2 5 ∞ 6.44 6.04 ∞ 0.163 
21 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 7 ∞ 3.65 2.00 ∞ 0.265 
22 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 9 ∞ 3.26 1.13 ∞ 0.292 
23 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 12 ∞ 2.93 0.47 ∞ 0.321 
24 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 7 ∞ 3.24 3.46 ∞ 0.241 
25 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 9 ∞ 2.91 2.23 ∞ 0.274 
26 10 8 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 12 ∞ 2.63 1.30 ∞ 0.309 
27 10 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 4.73 7.55 ∞ 0.230 
28 12 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 5.54 2.04 ∞ 0.204 
29 15 8 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 6.27 1.68 ∞ 0.182 
30 15 12 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 1 13.84 - 13.84 0.164 
Table 1: optimum policy, (M*, T*, t*), and optimum cost, Q*, under different 
parameter values. 
 One of the reasons for postponement is the notion that an immediate replacement
when a defect is detected (τ = 0) is cost-prohibitive. The results support this idea
indicating that the greater cτ the longer the optimum postponement time. Nevertheless
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the inspection frequency is robust against changes in cτ . When λ increases so do both the
inspection frequency and the optimum limit of postponement, albeit τ ? experiences the
most important change when there is a significant increase in λ. An increasing chance of
replacement at an opportunity arising after a true positive can be the reason for both.
When the cost of replacement on opportunity (co) is reduced, so does the inspection
interval, whereas the limit of postponement is extended. As before, the smaller is T ?,
the higher is the chance of triggering replacement. Extending the limit of postponement
(larger τ ?) increases the probability of a low-cost replacement at an opportunity.
Not only can a high rate of false negatives make postponement cost-inefficient. When
the cost derived from a failure (cF ) is high, then both T
? and τ ? decrease. With more
frequent inspection the maintainer is more aware of defect arrival, increasing both the
chance to detect one when it occurs and the chance of replacement on opportunity since
a positive inspection triggers the wait for an opportunity. The reduction in τ ? makes a
failure less likely to occur.
When the time to the defective state increases (in mean), inspection is relaxed but
the postponement time is shortened. This is because a longer time interval between
inspections makes it more likely that the unit remains in the defective state until the
defect is detected. A shorter τ ? is recommended to counterbalance this risk. Concerning
the delay time, when this increases both T ? and τ ? also increase. An increase in the
delay time means that the unit is robust and can function for a longer period. Thus the
maintainer can be less attentive to the unit.
In the introduction it was conjectured that imperfect inspections with false alarms may
justify postponement. According to the results in Table 1, this conjecture is supported,
and thus τ ? increases when α increases, and at the same time, the inspection frequency
is reduced as the maintainer is less confident about the efficacy of inspection.
Example 2: Time to defect arrival modelled by a Weibull distribution
Table 2 shows the optimum policy when the time to defect arrival is assumed to follow
a Weibull distribution with shape and scale parameters equal to 2 and 15 respectively.
The delay time follows an exponential distribution with mean value equal to 10. The rest
of the parameters are: λ = 0.3, cp = 1, c1 = 0.025, co = 0.8, cτ = 2, cF = 5, cd = 0,
µ2 = 0. The model with with negligible downtime due to inspection is considered.
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Case a b l Ct m2 Cd M* T* t* M*T* Q* 
1 0 0.1 0.3 2 0 0 6 2.58 12.9 15.47 0.135 
2 0.1 0.1 0.3 2 0 0 5 3.12 12.48 15.60 0.137 
3 0.2 0.1 0.3 2 0 0 4 3.85 11.55 15.39 0.138 
4 0 0.3 0.3 2 0 0 6 2.46 12.33 14.78 0.139 
5 0.1 0.3 0.3 2 0 0 4 3.55 10.65 14.20 0.140 
6 0.2 0.3 0.3 2 0 0 3 4.60 9.3 13.80 0.141 
Table 2: optimum policy (M*, T*, t*) and optimum cost, Q*, under model without 
downtime. 
 
 
The main difference with respect to the previous example is that now the preventive
replacement at MT is a preferable choice, instead of replacement at the limit for post-
ponement, since τ ? > (M? − 1)T ?. The unit is more prone to enter the defective state
as it ages since the memoryless property does not apply. The behaviour of the policy
concerning changes in α or β is as before, although now it can be observed that a higher
probability of false negatives shortens the time to preventive replacement at MT . In so
doing the maintainer gains protection against non-detected defects that in turn lead to
failure.
Example 3: Comparison of policies with and without postponement (τ = 0)
                                                                                                                                        
with                            
postponement 
 
without                                              
postponement 
Case a c l C0 Ct CF M* T* t* Q* M0 T0 Q0 
1 10 8 0.3 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 4.94 1.35 0.204 ∞ 5.81 0.207 
2 10 8 0.3 0.8 2 5 ∞ 4.67 3.97 0.215 ∞ 6.82 0.238 
3 10 8 0.3 0.8 3 5 ∞ 4.63 12.33 0.218 1 9.23 0.245 
4 10 8 0.2 0.8 1.5 5 ∞ 5.48 0.43 0.207 ∞ 5.81 0.207 
5 10 8 0.2 0.8 2 5 ∞ 5.04 2.59 0.227 ∞ 6.82 0.238 
6 10 8 0.3 0.8 1.5 8 ∞ 4.18 0.06 0.237 ∞ 4.23 0.237 
7 10 8 0.3 0.8 4 8 ∞ 3.46 8.51 0.293 1 6.86 0.308 
8 10 8 0.3 0.8 2 15 ∞ 3.15 0.05 0.318 ∞ 3.19 0.318 
9 10 8 0.3 0.8 3 32 ∞ 2.33 0.04 0.461 ∞ 2.36 0.461 
Table 3: comparison of policies with and without postponement (t=0). 
 
The works of Zhao and Nakagawa et al ([41]) and Zhao et al ([43]) compare models of
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delayed maintenance with standard policies in order to analyze their respective advantages
and disadvantages. This example presents a similar comparison between the model with
postponement (τ > 0) and the model without postponement (τ = 0), which is given
in subsection 3.1. Here T0, M0 and Q0 will denote, respectively, the optimum inspection
interval, the optimum maximum number of inspections and the optimum cost in the latter
case. Further X follows an exponential distribution with mean value a = 10, Y follows
a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 2 and scale parameter c = 8. The other
parameters are: µ2 = 0.0005, cp = 1, c1 = 0.025, cd = 500. Also, we assume perfect
inspections, that is, α = β = 0.
Cases 3 and 7 in Table 3 indicate that when cτ is comparable with cF (cF/cτ ≤ 2)
postponement is advantageous provided that cτ is the cost of immediate replacement after
a positive inspection in the policy without postponement. In these cases the immediate
replacement is cost-prohibitive and this makes preventive replacement at M = 1 the best
option when τ = 0. When case 1 is compared with case 7 and case 4 with case 1 it is
observed that the differences between the two policies are reduced if cτ or the rate of
opportunities, λ, decrease. However, the most notable feature is observed for very high
values of cF (cases 8 and 9). Then, τ tends to zero and T
? ' T0. That is, when the cost
of failure is very large and when the maintainer is confident that the inspection procedure
is free or errors, postponement may no longer be an advantageous policy.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents a model to consider the postponement of replacement of a system
when it is found to be in a defective state. The model, based on the delay-time concept,
assumes that the system can function while it is defective. Thus postponement of re-
placement can extend its useful life and reduce replacement cost. An opportunity-based
replacement is also assumed in addition to the scheduled preventive replacement. We
present the analysis of results studying the effect of changes in the model parameters.
The results show that the policy is cost-effective provided that the maintainer can rely
on the inspection procedure, the rate of opportunities is high enough, and the cost of
failure is not too high. Both the time to the defective state and the delay time also play a
central role in determining the time limit for postponement. High rates of false negatives
lead to a more conservative policy, relying on the scheduled preventive replacement rather
than postponement. Nevertheless when α increases the situation is reversed, extending
τ ?. When the cost of failure increases the time limit for postponement is reduced. Con-
cerning this point, the relations between both the opportunity cost and the failure cost
leading to τ = 0 can be explored in future work. As this paper focuses on the analysis of
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cost, the study of the consequences of postponement on the system reliability constitute
a further, pending issue that can be developed.
The examples reveal that the role of preventive replacement depends on the nature of
the time to defect arrival. When the time to defect arrival follows a Weibull distribution
the preventive replacement at M?T ? is finite in most cases, because the rate of defects
leading to subsequent failure increases as the unit ages. On the contrary when the time to
defect arrival is exponential and the probability of an undetected defect is low there is no
reason for the preventive replacement at M?T ?. If so, the unit is replaced at the limit of
postponement. However a high value of β (false negative) makes preventive replacement
preferable to postponement.
When comparing the policies, with and without postponement, the results show that
when the cost of failure is large and inspection is perfect τ tends to zero and both the
optimum policy and cost-rate converge to those in the policy with no postponement.
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